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Aside from hyper inflation, nothing damages rural financial 
markets (RFMs) more than loan defaults. While a few borrowers 
fail to repay in all types of lending, defaults have been 
particularly troublesome in agricultural credit programs in low 
income countries (Donald). In a few extreme cases almost none of 
the loans are repayed (e.g. Graham and Pollard), while in other 
cases recovery is satisfactory in the first phase of a program 
and then deteriorates (Esguerra). In still other situations 
chronic loan defaults have haunted credit programs for so long 
that policy makers come to expect a quarter to half of the loans 
made will not be repayed (e.g., in Bangladesh, India, Jordan, 
Mexico, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, and Upper Volta). 
While these problems have attracted the attention of policy 
makers and researchers, "default disease" is still not well 
understood. In the discussion that follows, I attempt to clear 
away some confusion about loan defaults and their measurement and 
go on to suggest general strategies that might allow more 
systematic diagnoses and treatment of these problems. I begin 
the discussion by challenging the argument that loan defaults are 
not a serious problem. I next turn to a discussion of the damage 
inflicted on rural financial markets by extensive loan default. 
This is followed by a discussion of measurement problem and a 
categorization of the causes of loan default. I conclude with 
some suggestions on ways to lessen these problems. 
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Some governments have realized unanticipated increases in 
income from oil, minerals, or crop exports and have used alleged 
credit programs as ways of distributing some of these windfall 
gains in rural areas, while other countries have simply tried to 
redistribute income through concessionary credit programs. Still 
other governments have used permissive and targeted loans to 
promote activities such as land reform, regional development, 
cooperatives, the use of new inputs, and crop production. 
Examples of these activities can be found in almost every low 
income country. 
A number of government and donor officials say they are not 
concerned about farmers' defaults in these programs because the 
loans are just money, pieces of paper, entries in account books, 
and only amount to transfer payments from lenders to borrowers. 
They go on to argue that default forbearance is a painless way of 
distributing income transfers to farmers, most of whom are 
assumed to be poor. It is further argued that granting loans to 
farmers--whether they are repaid or not--encourages borrowers to 
adopt new technologies and increase agricultural production, thus 
benefiting society. 
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These arguments and practices make me uncomfortable; I argue 
in the following pages that the social benefits of these 
practices are negligible and the costs are far greater than is 
generally perceived. I have three major reservations about these 
arguments. 
B_~g.;:~!S-~JY4!. AJ:_j_Q~C:),:tJQI.l 9_1.'_~~-f!.j,g_y 
My first criticism is that these practices allocate benefits 
regressively. Those who default on the largest loans receive the 
largest subsidies; those defaulting on small loans receive small 
subsidies; and those who receive no loan or who repay their loans 
receive no default subsidy. Since access to loans and size-of-
loan are highly correlated with the wealth of borrowers, and 
since it is impossible to confine defaults to just small loans, 
asset transfers through defaults always have a regressive impact 
on income and asset distributions. The relatively well-to-do, 
the powerful, and the dishonest gain more through permissive 
credit than do the honest, the weak, and the poor. 
!m.P~-~-'t __ Q_!! __ _R~QQY.£.~;!_Q1! 
My second criticism is that policy makers substantially 
overestimate the impact of formal loans on production. A large 
majority of farmers produce, make investments, and adopt new 
technologies without formal loans. They do this by drawing on 
savings, using informal loans, selling assets, or reducing 
consumption. While some farmers direct all additional liquidity 
received from a formal loan to an activity targeted by 
government, the more common response is for borrowers to do some 
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financial substitution. That is, to use only part of the 
borrowed liquidity for increasing the targeted activity. An 
example of this is a farmer who has for many years bought with 
his own money one sack of fertilizer. In response to a new 
government program he may take a formal loan for two sacks of 
fertilizer, actually buy two sacks instead of one, substitute 
part of the borrowed funds for his own money, and use the 
equivalent of half of his loan for non-fertilizer purchases. In 
this case the additional fertilizer use caused by the loan is one 
sack of fertilizer, not two as suggested by the loan agreement. 
The nebulous relationship between formal loans and 
agricultural output is demonstrated by several recent country 
examples. Between 1979 and 1984 the real value of formal 
agricultural credit in Brazil was approximately halved by the 
onslaught of inflation (Araujo and Meyer). At the same time 
agricultural output continued to increase. During the early 
1980s Indonesia had a substantial decline in the real volume of 
formal loans for rice production, but rice output continued to 
increase (Timmer). From this, I conclude there is no direct 
relationship between loans and output. Instead, the relationship 
is indirect, through the more efficient resource allocation that 
results from extensive financial intermediation. Credit volume 
and interest rates are feeble instruments for promoting crop 
production. The price of the product, new technology that 
increases crop yields, and prices of critical inputs are much 
more important in influencing farmer behavior than is credit. 
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My third reservation has to do with the hidden costs of 
default •. It is easy to see that washed-out bridges limit the 
effectiveness of a road system. It is less obvious that defaults 
destroy equally important "bridges" in financial markets, thus 
reducing the ability of the financial system to reallocate 
productive resources from surplus to deficit units within an 
economy through accepting deposits and making loans. Even worse, 
defaults destroy the most important product created by financial 
intermediation: working relationships between borrowers and 
lenders. Defaults isolate defaulting borrowers from future 
formal financial services and constrict the reach and coverage of 
formal financial intermediation. It is this debilitation of the 
" financial system that is the most serious problem created by 
defaults, a topic to which I now turn. 
y_,;_@.bili ty_of __ Intermediari~~ 
Large numbers of loan defaults undermine the viability and 
coverage of financial markets. Defaults reduce the volume of 
funds available for relending, tie up scarce managerial time, and 
diminish the reputation of the lender. This, in turn, makes it 
more difficult for intermediaries to obtain funds from 
government, donors, or depositors. This chokes both lendi~g and 
deposit-taking by the intermediary, thus lessening the 
connections of deficit and surplus units through financial 
intermediation. Morale problems and management turnover often 
accompany default disease. 
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Less obvious effects are equally important. Extensive and 
chronic defaults raise questions about the permanence of the 
lender. Defaults can multiply as borrowers who would normally 
repay fail to do so because they feel the lender will not be able 
to provide financial services in the future. Borrowers have less 
incentive to repay loans if they are uncertain about the ability 
of the lender to provide future financial services (Christen and 
Vogel). Defaults also foster corruption. It becomes more 
difficult for loan officers to resist corruption when they see 
extensive stealing by borrowers. Both lenders and borrowers see 
a financial system tolerating large amounts of default as a 
patron passing out grants. Chronic defaults are also a strong 
indication of a breakdown in loan-making decisions; loans are not 
being made on the basis of creditworthiness. 
M~asureJll~!});_ P_;".QQJ..~.Jilf? 
While the problems of loan default are widespread in many low 
income countries, information on the magnitude of these problems 
is usually vague (Gregory and Adams). Some authors have argued, 
for example, that the default problem is not nearly as serious as 
is sometimes thought because most delinquent loans are collected 
a few months after they are due (e.g. Shukla). Other authors 
have argued that default problems are more serious than is 
generally thought because popular loan recovery measures under 
represent the magnitude of the problem (e.g. Von Pischke). 
The most obvious explanation for this confusion is that loan 
recovery is tricky to measure, even when all of the data 
necessary to do so are available, because of the multiple 
dimensions in a loan portfolio (Bo1nick). Reasons for this are: 
(1) Some loan data are flow figures while others are stock 
figures--value of new loans made during a year, for example, 
compared to year-end-outstanding balance on loans. (2) Also, 
loans may be for different lengths of time: e.g., some loans may 
be for only a cropping season of 4 months, while other loans may 
not be due for several years. (3) Some lenders' loan portfolios 
may be growing in size, others may be contracting, while still 
others may have stable portfolios. (4) Some lenders may 
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regularly refinance loans that are not repayed, while other 
lenders may classify loans as delinquent the day they come due. 
(5) Some lenders may have regular procedures for writing off bad 
debt, while others carry this debt on their books indefinitely. 
And, (6) some lenders may be doing a careful job of recovery most 
of the loans made over the past several years. but be forced to 
carry on their books a number of bad loans made earlier. 
Because of the multiple dimensions in a loan portfolio, a 
single measure of loan recovery performance seldom gives a clear 
picture of loan recovery problems. Some measures overemphasize 
the importance of previous loan collection problems, others focus 
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only on current problems, and few widely used measures adequately 
reflect the aging of arrears. 
Humans who can land spaceships on the moon, correctly predict 
eclipses of the moon, and build the Suez Canal certainly are 
capable of designing measures that accurately show loan recovery 
problems. Why is the measurement of this problems so poorly 
handled in most countries? Why do concerned people spend so 
little time and effort monitoring loan recovery? Is the shoddy 
and confused reporting of loan recovery problems due to lack of 
incentives for those in responsible positions to spend more time 
accurately reporting on the severity of default disease? 
~e-~sons_ __ _fgr De~a-gJ_:t; 
Reasons for loan default can be grouped into three 
categories: those that are borrower based, those that are lender 
based, and other factors beyond the control of lenders and 
borrowers. Traditional concerns with this problem have focused 
on borrower explanations, while newer views stress flaws in 
lender procedures and improper uses made of financial markets. 
Borrower-b~!~_<!_B~-a~Q_I)_~ 
Most explanations for low loan recovery rates focus on 
borrowers. This includes bad weather or other adverse happenings 
that destroy the borrower's crops so he is unable to repay, the 
borrower being too poor to repay, a failure in the technology 
purchased with the loan, and moral defects in the borrower that 
make him feel he need not repay (Mustafa, Tokroni Sandaratne-
.. 
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1978, PCAC). The impression that most loan recovery problems are 
borrower based is reinforced by interviews with delinquent 
borrowers. It should not be surprising that most borrowers blame 
their repayment problems on someone else. (Likewise, interviewed 
lenders are seldom willing to volunteer that any of the loan 
recovery problem is their fault.) A number of studies have 
attempted to use statistical techniques to identify farmer 
characteristics that are closely associated with loan recovery 
performance, mostly giving inconclusive results; it is 
understandably difficult to measure borrower honesty and other 
personal characteristics that lead to loan repayment. 
LE!nQ.~r-:-_ba~~!i ReC!.sC?.n~ 
More recently, studies have concentrated on the shortcomings 
of lenders and their procedures to explain loan recovery 
problems. Explanations range from defective loan collateral, 
improper borrower screening, loans that were dispensed late, 
lender corruption, extension agents making loan decisions rather 
than credit officers, and lenders who were so disorganized that 
they do not properly request loan repayment. 
Some of the newest research on default disease focuses on the 
incentives borrowers have to repay loans and the value to a 
borrower of maintaining his credit rating with the lender by 
repaying his loan (Christen and Vogel). This research is 
suggesting that a significant part of default disease may be 
caused by low quality and undependable financial services. That 
is, many of the defaulting borrowers decide the quality of formal 
loan services may be so low that a relationship with the lender 
is not worth maintaining. 
.. 
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When might a credit rating with a lender have a low value for 
a borrower? Loans that involve lots of paperwork, long delays in 
getting loans, loans that are approved long after they are 
applied for, loans that come with inflexible terms, and loans 
granted without curtesy are not viewed favorably by borrowers. 
Also, borrowers value most highly loan sources that are 
dependable, will be around for a long time, those that offer a 
range of financial services, and those that allow borrowers lines 
of credit rather than just one formula loan each year. 
O't_q.er Reasons 
It is difficult for borrowers to repay their loans when 
natural disasters or wars destroy crops. Typhoons, droughts, 
floods, fires, and pests often do immense damage to crops and 
livestock. My impression is, however, that these 11acts of God 11 
are too often used as excuses for chronic defaults, rather than a 
valid reason (Stickley and Tapsoba). The fact that informal 
lenders are able to collect most of their loans, despite these 
natural disasters--else there would be few informal loans--hints 
that other factors must also be involved in the decision to repay 
loans. 
Nothing chills borrowers' wills to repay more than for a 
prominent politician to announce that loans need not be repaid. 
Political intrusions into the loan-making and loan-recovery 
process are considerable in countries where governments and 
donors provide most of the funds for lending, and where 
governments are pushing subsidies and targeting through rural 
financial markets (Ladman and Tinnermeier, Sanderatne-1986). 
These actions by governments create expectations that loan 
defaults will be forgiven in the future. 
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In addition, government policies that cause low economic 
returns in agriculture further dampen the ability and willingness 
of borrowers to repay loans. This includes exchange rates that 
"tax" agricultural exports, food price controls, and too little 
public investment in agriculture. 
The earlier discussed lack of careful measures of loan 
recovery performance is a symptom of deeper and more serious 
problems--a result of the way RFMs are being used in many low 
income countries. If governments are passing subsidies to 
borrowers through concessionary interest rates, why should 
objections be raised to enlarging the subsidy through defaults? 
If farmers are thought to need cheap credit to adopt new 
technology or to produce a socially desirable product, why not 
increase the subsidy by overlooking loan defaults. 
Defaults are the logical outcome of using financial markets 
to allocate subsidies and to push development priorities. Given 
this use of financial markets, it is not in the best interests of 
donors, policy makers, or employees of financial intermediaries 
to properly diagnosis and cure default disease. Von Pischke also 
points out that some loan defaults result from faulty credit 
project design. Those who set up the project often overestimate 
farmers' credit needs, ignore the large amount of income 
variability that most borrowers experience, and are too 
optimistic in their projections about the effectiveness of new 
technologies that accompany loans. These procedures result in 
some borrowers getting larger loans than they can service with 




Because there are many causes of default disease--as it is 
with cancer--there is no single cure. Likewise, because the mix 
of reasons for default varies across countries, its treatment 
must be time and place specific. Despite these limitation, I 
believe there are two interrelated changes that could be made in 
current procedures that would substantially enhance loan recovery 
performance in most countries. The first is for policy makers to 
make much less use of financial markets in largely futile 
attempts to transfer subsidies and for loan targeting purposes. 
The second is for financial intermediaries to substantially 
enhance the perceived quality of their financial services. 
Q~ange Way Fiq@nfia;t __ }!a~ket~ ar~ . .J!!.~i! 
In most countries it will be impossible to substantially 
improve loan recovery performance as long as policy makers insist 
on using financial markets to transfer subsidies and to target 
loans. These policies yield results that are often substantially 
different from what policy makers intend and seriously damage 
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the ability of the financial system to intermediate between 
deficit and surplus units. The flow of concessionary priced 
funds from governments and donors into rural financial systems 
also makes it impossible to mobilize sizable amounts of voluntary 
deposits in rural areas. It is often cheaper for intermediaries 
to use government money for lending than to mobilize deposits. 
This has two adverse effects on loan recovery: first, 
borrowers and lenders feel less pressure to repay and recover 
loans when it is mainly government money being lent. Second, 
borrowers have less incentive to sustain a relationship with an 
intermediary, by repaying a loan, when lenders do not offer other 
services such as deposits (Gonzalez Vega and Poyo). 
1.f!!P.~.Q_Y!=!_..Q1\a l i !Y__Q_~--~ ,i,_:Q<!I.'l_9.!.C!J ___ ~.~~Y.~.9-~~ 
I have seen a number of credit projects in low income 
countries where the quality of financial services provided by the 
intermediary is so poor and undependable that I wonder why most 
borrowers do not get a "divorce" from the intermediary by 
defaulting on their loans. I have seen programs where the 
borrower was forced to fill out 7 sets of long application forms 
for small- to medium-sized loans; where borrowers did not receive 
their planting loans until it was nearly time for harvest; where 
borrowers were forced to wait in line for several days before 
they could begin to negotiate their loan; where borrowers were 
forced to visit the intermediary 7-10 times to complete all of 
the steps necessary to get and repay a small loan; where 
borrowers of small amounts were forced to take formula loans in 
. . 
14 
the form of several sacks of fertilizer, when they only needed 
one sack of fertilizer plus some cash; where borrowers were 
unable to get small loans from their formal intermediary when 
family emergencies arose; and, where borrowers incur loan 
transactions costs that were 3-4 times their interest payments in 
order to obtain a small loan (Ahmed and Adams). 
With these problems it is little wonder that large numbers of 
farmers decide not to repay formal loans. They conclude that the 
future value of maintaining a relationship with the lender is 
worth less than the value of stealing the money borrowed. 
Q~~~lusion~ 
While some rural development occurs despite fragmented and 
inefficient financial system, agriculture cannot realize its full 
potential without efficient formal financial intermediaries. It 
will be impossible to create and sustain these institutions if 
loan recovery rates are not increased substantially in most low 
income countries. 
Widespread loan recovery problems persist because policy 
makers and donor agencies attempt to accomplish too much through 
RFMs. Default disease will not be substantially reduced until 
policy makers realize that RFMs are unable to distribute 
subsidies equitably and that targeting of loans cause few desired 
changes in the behavior of farmer-borrowers. Unfortunately, 
there is relatively little that employees of banks and 
cooperatives can do to change these policies. 
.. 
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At the same time, I am convinced that intermediaries have 
latitude to reduce defaults through improving the quality and 
quantity of their services. This includes cutting down on loan 
paperwork, speeding up the loan approval process, cutting down on 
the number of times borrowers must visit the lender, developing 
more flexible loans, and offering a variety of financial services 
including deposits. Lessening attempts to control the way 
borrowers use borrowed funds and emulating more of the services 
provided by informal lenders should be part of these efforts. 
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